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In all the discussion about the impact of privatisation and marketi-
sation on public service delivery, one area that is often overlooked is
banking services. Yet banking is an interesting case because it offers
an example of the state deliberately stimulating competition through
a government-owned business enterprise (GBE). Acknowledging this
potential role of the state and GBEs is important because, as Murray
Goot argues, ‘for a generation, much of the free market Right as well as
the interventionist Left seem to have forgotten the history of state inter-
vention not as a way of stifling competition but as a way of encouraging
it’ (2010, p. 83). Accordingly, in the first section of the chapter we pro-
vide an overview of how the Fisher Labor government (1910–13) aimed
to increase competition in banking by establishing the Commonwealth
Bank of Australia (CBA). This federal government bank was set up to
compete with both the privately owned and state government-owned
banks. We also highlight how, during the establishment phase of the
bank, a discourse of ‘community service’ ran alongside a ‘competition’
discourse (Goot 2010, p. 78) and explore how prior to privatisation, the
Commonwealth Bank was tasked with twin goals of increasing com-
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petition in the sector while meeting community service obligations. In
other words, throughout this period, the Commonwealth Bank was op-
erating under two institutional logics: a market logic and a community
logic. Under a market logic, the sources of legitimacy and author-
ity are the share price and shareholder activity and the norm is one
of self-interest (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury 2012, p. 69). Under a
community logic, legitimacy and authority are derived from belief in
trust and reciprocity and a commitment to community, and values and
norms are based on group membership (Thornton et al. 2012, p. 70).
This chapter shows how, over time, the community logic came to be
overshadowed by the market logic in the CBA.
In the Australian context, state intervention in banking has always
been cast as a way to ‘increase competition’; however, just what this
means has invariably reflected political, historical and economic rea-
soning (cf. Rosamond 2002). By the 1980s and 1990s, in line with
broader neoliberal discourse, it was thought that competition was best
achieved by exposing domestic markets to outside pressure and intro-
ducing overseas private sector banks into the sector. One consequence
of this was the privatisation of a raft of government-owned banks,
including the Commonwealth Bank. We show how opening up the
banking market and privatising government-owned banks, in particu-
lar the Commonwealth Bank, has produced mixed outcomes for retail
bank consumers and has allowed the large for-profit banks to argue that
market and community logics are not compatible.
Most recently, the pervasiveness of this discourse about the in-
compatibility of market and community logics has seen the former
federal Labor government (2007–13) turn to the smaller, not-for-profit
financial mutuals to deliver on community service obligations for the
sector, rather than stipulating that the large for-profit banks incorporate
such provisions into their practice. Mutual financial organisations de-
rive their legitimacy and authority from an associational logic, much
like the community logic Thornton and colleagues (2012) identify, in
that their authority and legitimacy come from belief in sharing and rec-
iprocity, embedded in a norm of the equality of all group members.
The promotion of mutuals as hybrid banks, run on both market
and associational logics, mirrors international trends in public sector
reform with governments increasingly turning to the not-for-profit sec-
tor to provide services and increase consumer choice (Kelly 2007).
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What is different about moves by the former federal Labor government
to champion financial mutuals is that they were seeking to increase
competition at arm’s length, with no direct involvement of the govern-
ment in the workings of those institutions. Rather they appear to be
using the notion of financial mutuals and mutuality as a discursive foil
to the dominance of the sector by the big four banks.
Competition, community service obligations and a
Commonwealth-owned bank
Love (1984, p. 42) reports that in 19th-century Australia there was a
‘deeply ingrained suspicion of the probity of bankers, and a conviction
that private banking, by its very nature, was not serving the interests
of the community as a whole’. These sentiments were reinforced by the
bank crash of 1893, which created the general belief that ‘the exist-
ing banks were avaricious and incompetent’ (Gollan 1968, p. 18). On
one hand, there was a general view that the private banks had saved
themselves at the expense of their customers by destroying their de-
posits (Butlin 1961), while, on the other, the various state government-
owned banks were seen to have acted with propriety and, as a result,
their customers were less affected by the crash (Singh 1991). Against
this backdrop the Labor movement began to campaign for a federal
government-owned bank that could wrest control of the financial sys-
tem from private bankers. A national, government-owned bank was
seen as a ‘weapon with which Labor could attack the entrenched po-
sitions of capital’ (Gollan 1968, p. 93) and where the public’s deposits
would be safe from ‘the perils of dividend-hungry shareholders and
speculating, reckless directors’ (Love 1984, p. 44).
When the Australian colonies became a Federation in 1901, the
newly formed Australian Labor Party began the process of developing
national policies on a range of issues on which the Commonwealth
Constitution gave the federal parliament power to act (Love 1984, p.
48). Section 51 (xiii) specified ‘Banking, other than State banking; also
State banking extending beyond the limits of the State concerned, the
incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper money’. The Labor Party
accepted this opportunity with alacrity because it offered a chance to
shape the country’s monetary system along lines similar to those advo-
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cated for state government-owned banks but on a national scale (Love
1984, p. 48). Accordingly, the focus of debate shifted in the Labor Party
from the state to the federal arena with support for government bank-
ing so strong that when a proposal to establish a Commonwealth Bank
came before the 1902 Federal Labor Conference it was approved with
very little discussion (Love, 1984).
In 1911 a ‘People’s Bank’ was born, one which would, in the words
of the Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, ‘be a bank belonging to the peo-
ple, and directly managed by the people’s own agents’ (Fisher 1911,
cited in Singh 1991, p. 120). Fisher went on to explain: ‘this is a business
concern pure and simple; it is not a matter of idealism’. Here Fisher is al-
luding to the fact that, from the outset, a key reason for establishing the
Commonwealth Bank was to engender competition in banking. Quig-
gin (1995, p. 31) argues that Australia was unique in the extent to which
GBEs operated alongside private firms, in industries such as banking,
airlines, insurance and telecommunications. In banking, as Goot (2010,
p. 82) has observed, the idea of the state as a competitor was pushed one
step further with the idea that it would not only compete against private
sector banks but other state government-owned banks. In the first years
of its existence the Commonwealth Bank did not compete aggressively
with the other banks, but its presence did have an impact on the state-
owned banks. This was in large part because when the Commonwealth
Bank began full operations in 1913 it took up exclusive right to use
post offices as branches, closing off this option to the state government-
owned banks that had been using the post offices as deposit agencies
(McCarthy 2002).
The Second World War provided the Commonwealth Bank with
the opportunity to increase its competitive position vis-à-vis the private
banks. During the War, the Commonwealth Bank was given the author-
ity of a central bank, and thereby equipped with the power to set inter-
est rates (Merrett 2006, p. 57). The role of the CBA was further strength-
ened with passing of the Commonwealth Bank Act (1945) which set a
clear directive for the CBA to compete with the other banks (Merrett
1998) and to expand its general banking business (Singh 1991, p. 11).
The 1945 Act constituted the bank as a central bank and reflected the
postwar Labor policy approach, which used public bodies to stabilise
the market system. Not surprisingly, the private banks were opposed
to the fact that the Commonwealth would be a competing commercial
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bank at the same time that it operated as a central bank. Over time,
these two functions were progressively separated within the bank, and
their formal separation was legislated in the Banking Act (1959), which
established two distinct bodies: the Reserve Bank of Australia and the
Commonwealth Banking Corporation (Evatt Research Centre 1988, p.
117).
From its establishment, it was believed that, by competing directly
with the private trading banks, the CBA would discourage the other
banks from taking unfair advantage of their customers by providing
competitive home loans, return strong dividends to the government,
and ensure good wages and conditions for employees in the sector. It
was the case that, until the early 1980s, home loan rates of the CBA
were significantly below those of most of its competitors, which led to
it becoming the largest lender for housing in Australia (Howard 1991,
p. 18). It also lent large sums to local and semi-government bodies
for essential services, including roads, electricity and sewerage (Evatt
Research Centre 1988, p. 22). Competing in the same segment of the
market as the private banks but with the benefit of economies of scale
and the backing of the federal government enabled the CBA to gener-
ate significant profits and pay reasonable dividends to the government.
For example, in 1987, in addition to paying taxes of $1.316 million, the
Commonwealth Bank transferred $61.4 million to government revenue
(Evatt Research Centre 1988, p. 138). Competition in the financial ser-
vices labour market also led to improved wages and working conditions
across the sector. With the CBA offering more attractive salaries, the
private banks had to follow suit in order to attract highly skilled work-
ers.
The CBA also generated business banking and increased its com-
petitive position by means of its Development Bank arm, founded in
1959. The Commonwealth Development Bank lent to small and rural
businesses which had potential but, because of a lack of security and/
or personal contacts, were either ignored by the private banks or could
not get access to reasonable funding (Jones 2002). The Commonwealth
Bank also played a crucial role in the development of the Australian
manufacturing industry by underwriting the original loans for both
BHP and General Motors Holden (Evatt Research Centre 1988, p. 22).
At the same time that the Commonwealth Bank Act (1945) set out
a clear aim for the CBA to compete with other banks, it also legislated
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for the bank to act in the national interest. As set out in Clause 8 of the
Act:
It shall be the duty of the Commonwealth Bank, within the limits
of its powers, to pursue a money and banking policy directed to
the greatest advantage of the people of Australia, and to exercise its
power under this Act and the Banking Act, 1945 in such a manner as,
in the opinion of the Bank, will best contribute to: a) stability of the
currency of Australia, b) the maintenance of full employment and c)
the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia (cited
in Evatt Research Centre 1988, p. 22).
This clause made manifest the community service obligations of the
CBA, which had been loosely framed with its establishment in 1911. As
Martin (1996, p. 111) explains:
A community service obligation arises when a government specif-
ically requires a public enterprise to carry out activities relating to
outputs or inputs which it would not elect to do on a commercial ba-
sis, and which the government does not require other businesses in
the public or private sector to undertake, or which it would only do
commercially at higher prices.
The CBA’s community service obligations involved lending to charities
and non-profit making bodies, and to local government as well as
semi-government authorities, occasionally at concessional rates, as well
as ensuring service delivery to people with disabilities, low-income
earners, people from non-English-speaking background and Aborigi-
nal people (Howard 1991, p. 18). Having a hybrid bank, which operated
under both market and community logics, in the sector had conse-
quences not only for the other banks in terms of competition, but also
for customers in terms of equitable access to financial services.
We can see how both a market logic and a community logic
(Thornton et al. 2012) influenced banking practice when we examine
the CBA’s prior commitment to the provision of an extensive branch
network. The Evatt Research Centre points out that if a bank branch
was to be found somewhere in the outback in the 1980s, it was most
likely to be a branch of the CBA (1988, p. 136). Prior to privatisation,
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the CBA had the biggest branch network in the industry, serving ap-
proximately 27 percent of the banking industry’s retail customers (ACA
1990). The cost of providing such an extensive bank branch network
was implied by David Anderson, Secretary of the CBA:
It would be difficult I think for a privately owned bank to perhaps
justify the total spread of branches. If we get to the stage of being to-
tally driven by (the) bottom line, then people are going to have less
of a service than they might be enjoying at the moment (cited in
Howard 1991, p. 18).
As a result of strict regulatory controls, Australian banks could not dif-
ferentiate the products they offered, therefore, market advantage was
achieved by offering customer service through an extensive branch net-
work, which allowed the CBA to attract more and more customers
(Taylor & Hirst 1983, p. 267). Under its charter as a government-
owned bank, the CBA’s obligation to cross-subsidise the less profitable
branches in the rural areas left its competitors little choice but to follow
suit and extend their branch networks.
In line with the community logic that informed much of the CBA’s
practice, this extensive branch network not only helped to ensure access
to banking services for Australians living in rural and remote com-
munities, it also helped to ameliorate the consequences of financial
illiteracy. Financial literacy is the ability to make informed judgements
and to make effective decisions regarding the use and management of
money (Noctor, Stoney & Stradling 1992). In the 1980s, levels of fi-
nancial literacy in Australia were low. One survey of 1500 Australian
adults revealed that 27 percent could not fill out deposit slips correctly,
39 percent failed in writing out cheques and 45 percent were unable to
keep records of their financial transactions (Wickert 1989, p. 53). How-
ever, at that time the limited number of bank products and an extensive
bank branch network meant that the level of financial literacy needed to
participate in the financial industry was also low. Most of the financial
transactions happened face-to-face, over the counter in branches, and
bank customer service officers were regarded as trusted advisors who
ensured that customers were not disadvantaged (Singh 1989).
The existence of a large, public bank that operated under both mar-
ket and community logics impacted the sector as a whole. Prior to its
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privatisation, the Commonwealth Bank shaped the nature of the Aus-
tralian banking industry by providing greater security and competitive
home loans to consumers, returning strong dividends to the Common-
wealth, ensuring fair employment conditions for workers in the sector,
lending to small and rural businesses and offering an extensive branch
network. The bank was a product of government legislation that ‘re-
flected a deeply entrenched view of the past that there is a valuable
contribution to be made to the economy by the public sector’ (Evatt Re-
search Centre 1988, p. 114). As Goot (2010) has argued, it is possible
then for a public sector provider to both drive competition in the sec-
tor, not just in terms of price but also to drive higher levels of service
delivery. The privatisation of the bank and deregulation of the industry
resulted in significant shifts in the banks’ relationships with their cus-
tomers. The consequences of these shifts are outlined in the following
section.
Competition, community service obligations and privatisation
In the previous section we outlined the role played by the CBA in en-
suring competition in the banking sector, access to affordable banking
products and engagement in a range of community service obliga-
tions. In this section of the chapter we show how privatisation of the
Commonwealth Bank in 1991 has led to mixed outcomes in terms of
competition in the retail banking sector. In addition, while rates of fi-
nancial literacy have remained similar to those prior to privatisation,
the number and complexity of financial service products on offer to
consumers mean that higher levels of financial literacy are needed if
consumers are to make prudent and informed financial decisions.
Prior to its election in March 1983, Labor had condemned the pro-
posals for financial deregulation put forward by the Campbell Commit-
tee (1981), which the Fraser Coalition government had commissioned
to inquire into the financial system in 1979. After the election, Labor’s
position on financial deregulation was rapidly reversed and, by 1986,
policies of deregulation more radical than those the Campbell Com-
mittee proposed had been adopted (Quiggin 2001). All this change
was framed within a discourse of increasing competition in financial
services. As Schaefer and colleagues (2011) have noted, the idea of
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competition has, under neoliberal regimes, been a significant driver
of efforts to deregulate and privatise. The Australian dollar exchange
rate was floated in December 1983 and exchange controls were lifted
(Hand 2001, p. 14). In 1984, foreign-owned banks were allowed to op-
erate in all areas of the industry, and as a result 16 licences were issued
for foreign banks, although not all were taken up. According to Ki-
tay (2003, p. 136), it was particularly notable that those foreign banks
which attempted to establish a retail presence made little impression
on the market at that time, and most restricted their activities primar-
ily to merchant banking activities. Around the same time a number
of domestic non-banking financial institutions such as building soci-
eties were granted banking licences. While extensive financial deregu-
lation was introduced in Australia between 1981 and 1985, at that time
privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank and the state government-
owned banks was not seriously advocated (Quiggin 1995, p. 31). So
while many argue that deregulation and privatisation invariably go
hand-in-hand, the case of banking shows that deregulation can occur
without privatisation of GBEs. This is important because, as Quiggin
(1995, p. 32) argues, it challenges the notion that privatisation is neces-
sary to promote reform of a sector and the association between reform
through regulation and privatisation is ‘primarily one of political com-
patibility rather than of logical implication’.
The privatisation of a number of government-owned banks, in-
cluding the federal government-owned Commonwealth Bank began in
the 1990s. The Commonwealth Banks Restructuring Act of 1990 con-
verted the Commonwealth Bank from a statutory authority to a public
company with conventional share capital and part-government owner-
ship. On 17 April 1991, the organisation became a public company with
a share capital governed by the Corporations Law but subject to certain
overriding provisions of the Commonwealth Banks Act 1959. The Com-
monwealth Bank was fully privatised in three stages between 1991 and
July 1996. Quiggin (2001) notes that, at each stage in the privatisation
of the Commonwealth Bank, the government made solemn assuran-
ces that this sale would be the last. However, these apparently binding
commitments to continue major public ownership were made and sub-
sequently broken. The need to rescue the State Bank of Victoria was
eventually used to force through the full privatisation of the Common-
wealth Bank (Quiggin 2001).
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While all this change was underpinned by a mantra of ‘increased
competition’ and better choice for banking consumers, the outcomes
of opening up the market to foreign competition and privatisation of
government-owned banks have been mixed. This is in part because at
the same time that bank licences were granted to building societies
and government-owned banks were privatised, there was a series of re-
tail bank mergers which resulted in the domination of the industry by
the big four banks: the Commonwealth, ANZ, NAB and Westpac. As
a result, Australia now has one of the most concentrated retail bank-
ing markets in the world, with only 12 domestic banks, nine foreign
subsidiaries and 35 foreign branch banks (not all of which offer retail
banking services) (APRA 2010).
Further consolidation of the industry is not possible because of the
‘four pillars policy’. In 1990 the then Labor Treasurer, Paul Keating, in-
troduced the ‘six pillars policy’ which precluded mergers between the
four major banks and the two largest insurers (AMP and National Mu-
tual) (Wu 2008). In 1997 the Wallis Inquiry into banking argued for the
removal of ‘six pillars policy’ and in response the then Coalition Trea-
surer, Peter Costello, removed the ban on mergers between insurance
companies but maintained a ban on mergers between the four banks.
By April 1997, the ‘six pillars policy’ had become a ‘four pillars policy’,
which removed the previous prohibition of foreign takeovers of Aus-
tralian banks but still prevented mergers among the four biggest banks
(Wu 2008).
While all these changes were intended to increase choice for con-
sumers, this did not occur across all product segments. In the home
mortgage area, consumer choice increased dramatically, with the Aus-
tralian Banking Association (ABA) reporting that ‘prior to deregulation
in 1995 customers had the choice of only 26 different home mortgage
products’ and just four years later the market was offering nearly 2,500
varieties of mortgages’ (Local Government Banking and Financial Ser-
vices Taskforce 1999, p. 11). Conversely, in the areas of retail transac-
tion accounts and small business banking competition remained very
weak (Connolly & Hajaj 2001, p. 7). In these product segments there is
very little price or product differentiation across the banks, particularly
the big four banks. Kitay and Rimmer (1997, p. 105) found that bank
managers did not consider competing on price or product innovation
to be a viable strategy.
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Innovations in service delivery afforded by technological innova-
tion offered the banks a significant way to increase profits through the
closure of branches and staff redundancies. The shift away from ‘bricks
and mortar’ service to service via a machine or in cyberspace has lead
to the widespread closure of bank branches across Australia. Between
1980 and 2011, the number of bank branches fell from 11,760 to 5,588
(APRA 2011). In 1998, Anthony Aveling, the then Chief Executive Offi-
cer (CEO) of the ABA, outlined the process involved in decisions about
branch closures to a House of Representatives Inquiry into regional
banking services (1999), in the following terms:
An individual bank will review the trends in an area. They will look
at what has been happening to their business over a long period of
time and they will make projections. If the conclusion that an indi-
vidual bank comes to is that the bank branch is no longer profitable,
or will not be profitable in the near future, then work is done on what
are the alternative services that may be provided in that particular
location (Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public
Administration 1998).
While the ABA claimed that only unprofitable banks were closed, the
House of Representatives Inquiry (1999, p. 21) found that it was not
only the unprofitable branches that had been closed, concluding that: ‘it
is neither fair nor constructive to perpetuate this impression which in
some ways could be seen to put the responsibility for a bank closing on
the township rather than on the banks’. The inquiry was correct to argue
that communities themselves should not bear responsibility for branch
closures, yet, it is the case that closures were spatially uneven, focus-
ing on remote settlements and deprived urban areas (Connolly & Hajaj
2001) and that this had negative consequences for those living there
because they lost access to fair and safe financial products from main-
stream suppliers (Beal & Ralston 1997). At the same time, financial
service consumers faced an increasing array of financial service prod-
ucts with less access to face-to-face delivery channels through which
these products could be explained. The need for financially literate con-
sumers has also been exacerbated by the rise of ‘self-service’ options
and the extended marketing of financial service products. Shifting atti-
tudes towards money from an old-economy focus on wages, cash and
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short-term investments towards a new-economy focus on wealth and
assets, savings and investments for the longer term has also increased
the need for more financially literate consumers (Finlayson 2009, p.
411).
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that in the lead-up to the 2001
federal election, banking polled as the third most important issue in
voters’ minds. The Financial Services Union (FSU), the Australian Con-
sumers Association (ACA), the Financial Service Centre, the Australian
Pensioners and Superannuants’ Federation (APSF) and the Consumer
Credit Legal Centre were actively campaigning for the government to
adopt a social charter for the banking industry. The social charter in-
cluded minimum service standards for customers, guaranteed access to
banking facilities for all Australians and an ongoing monitoring of fees
and charges (Workers Online 2000). In response to this discontent and
campaigning, the ABA commissioned a review of its Banking Code of
Practice. The review recommended sweeping changes to the Code and
took both banking industry and consumer groups by surprise in the
scope of the issues raised by the independent consultant, Mr Richard
Viney (Nixon 2001).
Three of the four major retail banks (notably not the CBA) re-
sponded by introducing a degree of self-regulation. This self-regulation
has led to some benefits for low-income customers. In July 2001 West-
pac launched its Customer Service Charter which, according to the
then Westpac Group Executive, Ann Sherry, ‘provides the community
with information on the way in which Westpac plans to deliver a better
outcome for its customers’ (Bland 2001). The latest version of this docu-
ment was produced in August 2011 and is entitled ‘Principles for doing
business’. The ANZ launched its Customer Charter in September of
2001 and it is still prominent on their website. The two-page document
sets out clear benchmarks for the provision of service to customers,
including commitments on access to services, personal information
and an improved complaint resolution process. The NAB held a con-
sultation forum chaired by social justice campaigner Reverend Tim
Costello, in May 2001 and this led to the introduction of a basic (fee
free) bank account for low-income customers (Bland 2001).
Privatisation of the government-owned banks has failed to deliver
on its promise of increasing competition, with Australia continuing to
have a highly concentrated banking market. In some segments, finan-
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cial services consumers have very little choice; in other areas, product
choice has expanded greatly, increasing the need for higher levels of
financial literacy. Widespread branch closures have left many commu-
nities without local financial services. Change has been fast-paced in
this sector and has not benefited all financial consumers. As the im-
pact of the loss of government-owned state banks became evident, a
range of government inquiries were called into the retail banking sec-
tor. The most wide-ranging of these, the Wallis Inquiry, concluded that
it is not the role of the banks to meet community service obligations
because cross-subsidisation of banking services would counteract effi-
ciency in a competitive market (Wallis 1997, p. 196). The ABA argued
to the Wallis Inquiry that it was the duty of the government or smaller
deposit-taking institutions to ensure equitable access to financial ser-
vices in Australia (Griffith 2000, p. 4). This final section of the chapter
shows how this argument has impacted on those smaller deposit-taking
institutions, with some of those organisations embracing calls to be the
‘fifth pillar’ in banking.
Competition, community service obligations and mutuals
As a result of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Australian retail
banking market has undergone a structural shift. As Johnston (2009)
reports, the big four banks – Westpac, ANZ, NAB and CBA – have used
their position to acquire weaker rivals and take over banking business
from smaller banks, non-bank lenders and mortgage brokers. In 2009,
the big four banks were writing more than 90 percent of the nation’s
new mortgages, compared with approximately 60 percent before the
GFC (Johnston 2009, p. 7). In response to further consolidation of the
market following the acquisition of BankWest by the Commonwealth
Bank in 2009, the architect of much of Australia’s banking reform and
the driver of privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank, Paul Keating,
reiterated the need for the federal government to retain the ‘four pillars
policy’ to ensure adequate competition in the sector.
In response to the increasing consolidation of the sector, in 2010
Wayne Swan, Treasurer in the Gillard Labor government, announced a
number of reforms aimed at increasing competition in the sector. The
central plank of these reforms was the creation of a fifth banking pil-
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lar, which he envisaged as the combined power of the mutual sector.
Financial mutuals are not-for-profit organisations that are owned by
and for their members. Mutualism can be described as a sort of radical
communitarianism or collectivism, in which individuals are tied to oth-
ers through a variety of economic and social links (Parker, Fournier
& Reedy 2007, p. 186). A mutual organisation, then, is owned by the
people that do business with it. All members of the mutual have equal
voting rights, with one vote per member, and any profits are reinvested
back into the mutual for the benefit of members. As noted above, mu-
tuals operate under an associational logic, which as Cato (2013) argues
is based on notions of reciprocity and mutualism that long predate the
market-based economy that is so often presented as the (ahistorical)
norm.
In Australia, credit unions are the most common form of financial
mutual. The early Australian credit union movement drew on both
Raiffeisen philosophy, which influenced the movement in Europe, and
Catholic teaching, which underpinned the development of credit
unions in Canada and the United States. In the 1850s in Europe,
Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen, a German burgomaster, adapted the
Schulze-Delitzch concept of self-help people’s banks to establish an in-
dependent farmer-based credit association (Lewis 1996, p. xxi). The
idea of mutual self-help is central to the Raiffeisen notion of ‘limitless
liability, achievable through a bond of association, whereby a person’s
trusted standing in the community and the knowledge co-operators
had of each other acted as security in seeking loans from a community
pool of funds’ (Lewis 1996, p. xxi). Across the Atlantic, in Canada,
Alphonse Desjardins, a parliamentary reporter inspired by the Papal
Encyclical Rerum novarum (1891), developed his own philosophy for
credit unions. This philosophy shared many of the principles of the
European movement, including the notion of limitless liability, open
membership, education in cooperation and economic and financial re-
sponsibility. Perhaps in keeping with a particular pragmatic Australian
identity, the motivation of the early credit union pioneers in Australia
has been characterised as simply a way to make personal credit avail-
able to ordinary working people (Cutcher & Kerr 2006). During this
time, the personal credit market was dominated by loan sharks and
hire-purchase finance companies, which often charged interest rates
in excess of 80 percent (Cutcher & Kerr 2006). In a bid to regulate
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this burgeoning market, the NSW government enacted the NSW Small
Loans Facilities Act in 1941. Credit unions were formed around bonds
of association that related to working for the same employer, involve-
ment in a social group or residing in a particular geographical area.
A small number of mutual building societies continue to operate
in Australia today. Originally, the benefits of property ownership and
the difficulty in obtaining housing finance from banks or private mort-
gagees saw the concept of building societies transplanted from the
United Kingdom and take seed in Australia. Malcolm Hill (1959, p.
10) reports that, ‘while there is little information on the early history
of building societies in Australia, it seems that the first societies were
formed in the 1840s’. However, it was in the 1880s when Australian
building societies experienced their first expansion (Hill 1959, p. 4).
The second period of growth for building societies came during the
period of prosperity that followed the Second World War during the
1950s and 1960s (Lyons 1988, p. 388).
In Australia, up until the 1980s, mutuals were subject to their
own legislative requirements and were afforded tax incentives. Not
being subject to the same strict reporting requirements as the large
mainstream banks and the benefits from the reduced taxes helped sus-
tain a wide range of credit unions and mutual building societies who
serviced discrete memberships (Cutcher & Mason 2013). However, a
range of structural changes, most notably, demutualisation of many
consumer and producer co-operatives, privatisation of the public sec-
tor, and deregulation of the financial services sector, made it increasin-
gly difficult for smaller credit unions to survive. The result was a raft of
amalgamations which saw credit union numbers fall from 549 in 1983
(Lewis 2001, p. 4) to fewer than 90 today. In 2014, the Customer Owned
Banking Association, the peak industry body for financial mutuals, rep-
resented 77 credit unions, seven building societies, 11 mutual banks
and 13 friendly societies.
Treasurer Swan’s reforms sought to improve the mutual sector’s
ability to compete with the major banks. He instructed the Australian
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) to fast-track approval of more
than 20 mutuals using the term ‘bank’ if they apply (at the time of writ-
ing, 11 credit unions had moved to calling themselves mutual banks).
Further, mutuals were to be able to display a new, official ‘government
protected deposits’ symbol that confirms customer savings are pro-
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tected in the same way as bank deposits, and Treasury was instructed
to help mutuals raise cheaper funding (Gluyas 2010). Not surprisingly,
mutuals welcomed the Treasurer’s endorsement. However, many com-
mentators are doubtful that the mutual sector has the capacity to be
considered a viable fifth competitor in the sector. Most of these con-
cerns relate to insufficient capital, lack of scale and the capacity of a
highly diverse grouping of relatively small institutions to act in concert
and in united opposition to four major banking corporations (Johyn
2010; Oldfield 2012).
Nevertheless, the persistence of financial mutuals remind us that
it is possible to combine market and associational logics in hybrid
banking organisations that strike a balance between making profits and
meeting community service obligations. One example is Traditional
Credit Union (TCU), Australia’s only Aboriginal-owned deposit-taking
institution, which has been involved in service delivery to Indigenous
people living in remote communities across the Northern Territory.
With a head office in Darwin, it provides banking services in local lan-
guages delivered by Indigenous staff in 11 remote Aboriginal commu-
nities. TCU reinvests any surpluses they generate back into the credit
union and, in particular, to the education and training of their Indige-
nous staff. Their approach to employing Indigenous people, delivering
financial literacy programs and crafting locally responsive banking ser-
vices has seen them win a number of national awards.
As noted above, following the GFC, the Australian retail banking
market has become even more consolidated. At the same time that
there are fewer suppliers of banking products, the range and complexity
of those products has increased and this has created challenges for the
significant number of financial consumers with low financial literacy.
In March 2011, the Gillard Labor government launched the National
Financial Literacy Strategy, which aimed to provide a set of ‘initia-
tives to improve the financial literacy of all Australians and enhance
their financial wellbeing’ and transfered responsibility for delivering on
the strategy to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
(ASIC 2011, p. 1). The strategy acknowledges that consumers now have
greater responsibility for their financial wellbeing but have been essen-
tially left alone to gain the capability to make the right decisions on
financial matters. ASIC’s key development in this area has been the
construction of a new website, Money Smart, which aims ‘to engage
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people and help consumers and investors make financial decisions that
improve their lives, by providing information, tools, guidance and mo-
tivation’ (ASIC 2011, p. 7). The Appendix to ASIC’s strategy report sets
out the financial literacy priorities and lists goals they wish to achieve
against a somewhat vague timeline (short-term, medium, ongoing) in
partnership with schools, the Vocational Education and Training sec-
tor, government departments and agencies and unions. Nowhere is
there mention of working in partnership with financial service insti-
tutions or peak industry bodies such as the ABA. Bringing banks and
their representatives back in as part of the solution is important be-
cause, as Erturk and colleagues (2007, p. 571) argue, financial literacy
programs need to be accompanied by a ‘re-think of the design of com-
plex financial products that reflect the kinds of risk-return preferences
and innate inertia of many financial consumers’. Rather than looking
towards not-for-profit charities and non-government agencies to meet
the challenge of educating Australians in financial literacy, the govern-
ment should have the banks as a central plank of their strategy, making
them responsible not only for the delivery of educational programs, but
also for the provision of consumer-friendly and affordable products and
services.
By championing mutuals with their associational logic as a fifth pil-
lar, there is a danger that they alone will be left with responsibility for
meeting the community service obligations of the industry as a whole.
There is no doubt that mutuals have played, and should continue to
play, a key role in the financial sector. The associational logic which
shapes their culture, practice and structure means that they are, in
many cases, best placed to meet the needs of bank consumers who
might otherwise find themselves excluded from access to necessary
financial services. However, even when combined, the mutual sector
cannot match the reach of the four major banks. The majority of Aus-
tralians continue to bank with one of the four majors. Therefore, to
ensure equitable access to affordable and appropriate financial services
and products, governments need to regulate the sector so that all bank-
ing organisations operate as hybrids, combining both market and com-
munity logics, so that they derive their legitimacy from both their
profit-making activities and their community service initiatives and re-
sponsibilities.
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Conclusion
One hundred years ago, the then Labor government established a bank
which would, in the words of Clyde Cameron, a member of the Whit-
lam Labor government, ‘provide genuine competition to private com-
panies which would otherwise co-operate with each other to defraud
the public’ (cited in Goot 2010, p. 80). The Labor government was keen
to increase competition in the banking industry, this time by encourag-
ing consumers to shift their banking business to the mutual sector. It is
unclear what the conservative government’s position will be. However,
if they accept that the government’s role in the sector is to ensure the
ready availability of fair and reasonably priced financial services, then
they should look for ways to ensure that banking organisations oper-
ate under both market and community logics. Creating these hybrid
organisations will require the government to regulate for community
service obligations in the same way that they were legislated for the
Commonwealth Bank when it was established. Mutuals, rather than
being a fifth pillar for the sector, could work as models of the kind
of hybrid organisations needed to ensure the financial inclusion of all
Australians.
This chapter has demonstrated that over time, the structure and
operation of financial services in Australia have been the outcome of
the interplay of a market logic, a community logic and an associational
logic. This chapter has sought to show that financial service consumers
are best served when a community logic operates alongside a market
logic in the same organisations. Both the case of the government-
owned Commonwealth Bank and the case of financial mutuals shows
that it is possible for these two logics to co-exist and that bringing
them together is a way to ensure equitable access to financial knowledge
products and services.
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